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Why One Should Count only Claims with which One Can Sympathize 
 
Suppose that you are a manager in a public health system that serves a very large 
population. You have a fixed amount of resources to allocate to various novel interventions. 
Furthermore, suppose that all individuals with a given ailment have the same health-related 
well-being and that in arriving at your decisions, you must take account of only people’s 
health-related well-being. Now consider the following case. 
 
Death versus Paraplegias: You must choose to allocate a fixed amount of resources 
to precisely one of the following interventions.  
 
Death: Avert the death of one young adult from appendicitis. (Rather than die, he 
will lead a full life in good health.) 
 
Paraplegias: Avert a number N of cases of paraplegia among young adults. 
 
Is there a natural number N of people you could prevent from becoming paraplegic 
for which you should avert this number of cases of paraplegia rather than save one 
young adult’s life?  
 
Next, consider the following case. 
 
Death versus Headaches: You must choose to allocate a fixed amount of resources 
to precisely one of the following. 
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Death: Avert the death of one young adult from appendicitis.  
 
Headaches: Prevent a number N of people from suffering a mild headache for a day. 
 
Is there a natural number N of people you could save from such a headache for 
which you should spare them a headache rather than save a young adult’s life?  
 
In this paper, I will defend the following, “Yes; No” pattern of response to these 
questions. There is a natural number N large enough such that one ought to avert this 
number of cases of paraplegia rather than save one life, but there is no natural number of 
people one can spare a headache such that one ought to avert their headaches rather than 
save the single life. In deciding whether to save a single life or a number of people from a 
lesser harm, the number one can save from the lesser harm matters to what one ought to 
do if and only if the lesser harm is close enough in size to the harm of death to be “relevant” 
to it. Considerable harms (such as paraplegia) are close enough in magnitude to the harm of 
premature death to be relevant, so that averting a very large number of considerable harms 
can permissibly take priority over saving a life. By contrast, very small harms (such as a 
headache) are not close enough in magnitude to the harm of an early death to be relevant, 
so that no number of averted headaches can permissibly take priority over saving a life. I 
shall refer to this view as “Aggregate Relevant Claims,” or ARC.1 
                                                     
1 A view of this kind is defended in Scanlon (1998, pp. 238-41); Temkin (2012, Chapters 2 and 3); Kelleher 
(2014); and Voorhoeve (2014). Kamm (1993; 2007; 2014) also endorses a view of this type, although she 
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ARC contrasts interestingly with standard views of distributive justice. On 
utilitarianism, one ought to allocate resources towards curing the lesser ailment just in case 
the total well-being generated by curing N such ailments exceeds the total well-being 
generated by saving the life. In both cases, if N is sufficiently large, one therefore ought to 
cure N people of the lesser ailment rather than save one life. In giving such a “Yes; Yes” 
answer to the two opening questions, utilitarianism agrees with some of its familiar rivals. 
Standard versions of prioritarianism (which is unconcerned with inequality per se but which 
gives some, non-infinite extra weight to improving lives with a low absolute level of well-
being) hold that if the number of people one can cure of the lesser ailment is large enough, 
then one ought to cure this larger number rather than save a life. The same is true of 
standard versions of pluralist egalitarianism (which cares both about reducing inequality and 
about improving the well-being of each person). As shown in Fleurbaey et al. (2009), on 
both standard versions of prioritarianism and pluralist egalitarianism, there is a point at 
which one ought to save the greater number from the harm of a headache rather than 
prevent one death (albeit that the number for which the lesser ailments jointly take priority 
over one death is greater on these views than it is on a utilitarian view). 
ARC also contrasts with the maximin principle, which holds that one ought always to 
maximally improve the lot of the worst off. On this view, in both Death versus Paraplegias 
and Death versus Headaches, one should avert the death no matter how many lesser 
ailments one could avert instead. The maximin principle therefore mandates a “No; No” 
pattern of response to our opening questions. Table 1 summarizes the responses of these 
different theories of distributive justice.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
argues that the harm of paraplegia is not, in all decision contexts, large enough to be relevant to the harm of 
death. 
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Table 1. Theories of distributive justice and answers to Death versus Paraplegia and Death 
versus Headaches   
Is there a natural number N of people cured of 
the condition such that one should cure this 
number of people rather than save a young 
adult’s life?  
Headache 
Yes No 
Paraplegia 
Yes 
Utilitarianism 
Prioritarianism 
 Pluralist egalitarianism 
Aggregate Relevant Claims 
 
No 
 
 Maximin 
 
While there is only limited research on people’s views, a review of existing studies 
concludes that there is some (albeit imperfect) evidence that a substantial share of people’s 
judgments align with ARC (Voorhoeve, n.d.). The results of a new online survey (N = 532) 
primarily among philosophy students at the London School of Economics and members of 
the Philosophy in Europe (‘philos-l’) distribution list are consistent with this finding (Rueger 
2015). As reported in Table 2, a substantial majority of respondents answered these 
questions in a manner that is consistent only with ARC. The sample is, of course, not 
representative of populations in the developed world. Moreover, it is probably 
unrepresentative even of the typical views of philosophy students and philosophers, since it 
is likely that those with an interest in the permissibility of aggregation were 
overrepresented. Nonetheless, the findings indicate that ARC’s judgments are attractive to 
people beyond the small congregation of moral philosophers who have defended ARC in 
writing. 
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Table 2. Online Survey Responses to Death versus Paraplegia and Death versus Headaches 
cases (in percent, N = 532). 
Is there a natural number N of people cured of 
the condition such that one should cure this 
number of people rather than save a young 
adult’s life?  
Headaches 
Yes No 
Paraplegia 
 
Yes 
 
4.1  63.9 
 
No 
 
0.8 31.2  
 
Notwithstanding its unique ability to arrive at appealing judgments in these cases, 
ARC faces several challenges, articulated by Daniel Hausman (2015) and others (Broome 
2002; Norcross 2002; Parfit 2003; and Halstead, forthcoming). My aim in this paper is to 
defend ARC against them.  
One challenge is to delineate which types of claim are relevant and irrelevant and 
provide a clear rationale for the distinction. Section I attempts to meet this challenge. 
Section II defends the proposed rationale against the objection that it is merely cobbled 
together to yield the desired case judgments. Section III responds to the charge that ARC 
implausibly makes one’s priorities between two interventions depend on which alternative 
interventions are available. Section IV considers and rejects Hausman’s claim that ARC is 
worryingly at odds with both current practice and our moral sentiments. 
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I. A Rationale for Aggregate Relevant Claims 
 
In the type of cases we shall consider,2 ARC holds the following: 
(1) Each individual whose health-related well-being is at stake has a claim. 
(2) These people’s claims compete just in case they cannot be jointly satisfied.  
(3) An individual’s claim is stronger: 
(3.1) the more her health-related well-being would be increased by being aided; 
and  
(3.2) the lower the level of health-related well-being from which this increase 
would take place.  
(4) A claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative to the strongest 
competing claim. 
(5) One should choose the alternative that satisfies the greatest sum of strength-
weighted, relevant claims (Voorhoeve 2014, p. 66). 
  
ARC is grounded in the following idea. Both an aggregative and a non-aggregative 
approach to distributive justice impose legitimate demands on us. These demands 
sometimes conflict. ARC adjudicates between them in a reasonable way (Voorhoeve 2014, 
pp. 68-70).  
                                                     
2 For simplicity, I shall only consider decisions under certainty involving public action to alleviate naturally 
occurring harms. Furthermore, the alternatives under consideration give a person either the best or the worst 
feasible outcome for her. Finally, claims to an alternative are either all relevant or all irrelevant. 
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On the aggregative approach, the equal value of each person’s well-being gives one 
reason to assign equal and positive marginal moral importance to every person’s claim of a 
given strength. It does so by regarding the satisfaction of N claims of a given strength as N 
times as important as the satisfaction of one such claim. This approach mandates the 
satisfaction of the greatest sum of strength-weighted claims.  
On the non-aggregative approach, the separateness of each person’s life requires 
that one confront each person’s claim, taken alone, with each competing claim, taken alone 
(Nagel 1979, p. 116f). From an objective standpoint, in these comparisons, a stronger claim 
always outcompetes a weaker claim. Since it relies entirely on such pairwise comparisons, 
when it takes this objective perspective on the claims at issue, the non-aggregative 
approach concludes that, when claims differ in strength, it is most important to satisfy the 
individually strongest claim.3 If one were instead to fulfil other claims, then the greater the 
difference between the strongest claim and the feebler, fulfilled claims, the more one’s 
choices would depart from this dictum of the non-aggregative approach. 
ARC mediates between these approaches as follows. It tells one to maximize the 
fulfilment of claims (the aim of the aggregative approach) under the constraint that these 
claims are relevant—which is just to say that one should not depart “too far” from the 
                                                     
3 The strength of a person’s claim is a function both of how much of an increment in well-being a person could 
receive and how badly off he would be otherwise. Neither of these two elements takes lexical priority over the 
other: a large potential gain to a moderately well off person can yield a stronger claim than a smaller potential 
gain to a badly off person. The strongest claim is therefore not necessarily made on behalf of the person who 
would be worst off. Contrary to what Thomas Nagel’s writes in some passages (see Nagel 1979, p. 123), but in 
line with what he suggests in others (see Nagel 1979, p. 125), the non-aggregative view is therefore 
inconsistent with maximin. 
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dictum of the non-aggregative approach. But, we must now ask: What would represent such 
an unacceptable departure from the non-aggregative approach? Put differently, which 
claims are irrelevant? Hausman (2015, p. 213) puts this question as follows: 
 
“those who maintain that some benefits or burdens are relevant and that some are 
not need to explain what makes the aggregative [approach] appropriate to some 
cases and (…) [non-aggregative] pairwise comparison (…) appropriate to others.” 
 
To answer Hausman’s question, I shall now offer a richer characterization of this 
approach, building on Voorhoeve (2014, pp. 70-5). On this characterization, it will emerge 
that factors internal to the non-aggregative approach make some departures from its 
requirement to “satisfy a strongest claim” especially serious. 
This more fully developed version of the non-aggregative approach relies on 
distinguishing two standpoints from which one can carry out the aforementioned pairwise 
comparisons. From an objective, or impartial, standpoint, the satisfaction of a person’s 
claim of a given strength, taken alone, is just as important as the satisfaction of any other 
person’s claim of that strength; and the satisfaction of one person’s stronger claim is more 
important than the satisfaction of another’s weaker claim. This is the standpoint that yields 
the verdict that one should always satisfy a strongest claim when claims are pitted against 
each other one-to-one.  
However, one can also consider this competition from a subjective standpoint. I will 
refer to this standpoint as the “permissible personal perspective.” To characterize this 
standpoint, I shall assume that to an extent, an individual can be legitimately partial to his 
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own interests.4 When one takes up the permissible personal standpoint of an individual (call 
him P), one imaginatively places oneself in P’s position while taking on both P’s maximally 
morally permissible degree of concern for his own well-being and the minimally required 
degree of altruism towards a stranger. One then compares his claim with the strongest 
competing claim. Next, one establishes whether, if P were acting solely on the hypothesized 
pattern of self- and other-concern and had to choose whether his own claim or the 
stranger’s competing claim would be met, he would give priority to the stranger’s claim in a 
one-to-one comparison.  
At this point, there are two possibilities. The first is that P’s claim is strong enough 
relative to the strongest competing claim to permit him to regard the satisfaction of his own 
claim as at least as important (from his personal standpoint) as satisfying the stranger’s 
competing claim when they are compared one-to-one. Precisely when this is the case, one 
can sympathize with a desire to press P’s claim in the face of the strongest competing claim, 
in the following sense. If one were to place oneself in his position, taking on his maximally 
permissible degree of self-concern, one would also want to press one’s claim.5 Such 
sympathy is possible, of course, when P’s claim is objectively stronger than the stranger’s 
claim. But such sympathy is also possible when P’s claim is, objectively speaking, somewhat 
weaker than the stranger’s claim, because from P’s permissible personal point of view, P’s 
own claim takes on special significance.  
                                                     
4 In this, I follow Smith (1982) [1790]; Nagel (1991); Kamm (1993); and Scheffler (1994).  
5 Following Smith (1982 [1790]), I consider only a moralized form of sympathy which involves placing oneself in 
another’s shoes whilst assuming morally proper desires and emotions. Sympathy, so conceived, need not 
involve feeling along with another’s actual wants and sentiments. 
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The second possibility is that even from P’s permissible perspective, fulfilling P’s 
claim is less important than fulfilling the stranger’s claim. This will occur when P’s claim is 
very much weaker, objectively speaking, than the stranger’s claim. Under these 
circumstances, one cannot sympathize with a desire to press P’s claim in the face of the 
strongest competing claim when these claims are pairwise compared. 
This distinction between claims one can sympathize with pressing in the face of the 
strongest competing claim and those one cannot so sympathize with marks a morally 
significant divide within the non-aggregative approach. Suppose that in a competition 
between a weaker and a stronger claim, one can sympathize with the desire of the person 
with the weaker claim to press for the satisfaction of her claim. Of course, when one 
subsequently takes up the position of the person with the stronger claim, one will then also 
sympathize with his desire to advance his stronger claim. Under these circumstances, it 
follows that when one imaginatively places oneself in the position of each person in turn 
and compares each person’s claim one-to-one against the competing claim, one retains a 
lively sense of the conflict of priorities, because one can sympathize with each person’s 
desire to prioritize their claim.  
By contrast, consider a case in which, in a one-to-one competition between a weaker 
and a stronger claim, one cannot sympathize with the desire to prioritize the weaker claim. 
Under these circumstances, when one imaginatively places oneself in the position of each 
person involved in turn, one will desire to give priority to the stronger claim even when one 
takes up the permissible personal perspective of the person with the weaker claim. 
Sympathetic identification with each person then gives no sense of conflict, because there is 
agreement from each person’s permissible viewpoint that the stronger claim should be 
prioritized when it is compared pairwise to the weaker claim. 
12 
 
One can draw on this distinction between claims with which one can and cannot 
sympathize to formulate the following criterion of relevance. A person’s claim is relevant 
just in case one can sympathize (in the sense articulated) with its possessor’s desire to 
prioritize it over the strongest competing claim.6 
By way of illustration, suppose that P is facing paraplegia and the strongest 
competing claim is to life-saving treatment. It seems consistent with maximally permissible 
self-concern (and minimally required other-concern) to prioritize saving oneself from 
paraplegia over saving a stranger’s life. To see this, suppose that P faces becoming 
paraplegic and a stranger has contracted a terminal illness. Both threats are due to natural 
causes for which no one is responsible. P must choose whether to use his own resources to 
avert becoming a paraplegic or instead to cure the stranger’s terminal illness. Moreover, no 
one else can save them from harm. While it would be admirable of P to use his resources to 
save the stranger’s life, it also would be supererogatory to do so—P is morally permitted to 
give priority to his own needs in this case. On the proposed criterion of relevance, P’s claim 
is therefore relevant to a life. It follows that averting a sufficiently large number of cases of 
paraplegia can take priority over saving a life.  
Now suppose that P will soon develop a headache. It is inconsistent with maximally 
permissible self-concern (and minimally-required other-concern) to save oneself from a 
headache rather than save a stranger’s life. On the proposed criterion, P’s claim is therefore 
irrelevant; no number of averted headaches can jointly take priority over saving a life. 
                                                     
6 The criterion of relevance proposed here draws inspiration from the appeal in Crisp (2003) to the distinction 
between claims one can and cannot sympathize with. However, despite this similarity of foundation, as 
explained in Voorhoeve (2014, n. 6) ARC is substantially different from the view put forward by Crisp (2003). 
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 To sum up: the non-aggregative approach requires one to take up both an objective 
point of view on each person’s claim and the personal point of view of each individual. From 
the objective point of view, one must simply satisfy a strongest claim. By contrast, when one 
takes up the standpoint of each person in turn, one divides claims into two kinds: there are 
those which one can permissibly desire to prioritize over the strongest competing claim and 
those which one cannot permissibly desire to prioritize over the strongest competing claim. 
The former are claims with which one can sympathize from a person’s subjective point of 
view; the latter are claims with which one cannot so sympathize. From the personal point of 
view of each, it is unacceptable to fulfil the latter type of claim. ARC respects this verdict 
made from the non-aggregative, personal standpoint by mandating the satisfaction of all 
and only those claims with which one can sympathize. Since weaker claims that one can 
sympathize with cannot differ tremendously in strength from the strongest competing claim, 
ARC thereby also avoids departing very far from the dictum that emerges from the non-
aggregative, objective standpoint. These are the senses in which ARC does some justice to 
the demands of non-aggregative morality.  
 
II. An Objection to this Rationale 
 
I shall now consider the following objection to the proposed criterion of relevance and its 
associated rationale: they are merely jerry-rigged to yield the desired case judgments. 
Halstead (forthcoming, pp. 6-7) puts this challenge as follows: 
 
“We can make an infinite number of modifications to the aggregative and non-
aggregative approaches in order to render them consistent, but, in the absence of an 
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adequate justification for these modifications, they will be ad hoc. One implication of 
these modifications is that they allow us to hold on to the commonsense case 
judgements [in response to our opening questions]. (…) [But] ARC is supposed to be 
justified without appealing solely to these judgements.” 
  
 These remarks present an opportunity to clarify the attempted justificatory strategy. 
This strategy is the familiar method of reflective equilibrium, in which one seeks moral 
principles that offer a good explanation of confidently held case judgments and that cohere 
with other attractive moral principles and still deeper moral ideals (Daniels 2013). In this 
process, the fact that particular case judgments follow from appealing moral principles 
strengthens our confidence in these case judgments. But it is also the case that conformity 
with case judgments supports our confidence in the correctness of these principles. The 
case judgments in question therefore contribute to the justification of ARC.7 
 Of course, in turn, ARC must offer some support for the judgments that a large 
number of lesser harms can permissibly jointly outcompete the harm of death in Death 
versus Paraplegias but cannot do so in Death versus Headaches. It does so by explaining 
these judgments as the consequence of a reasonable sensitivity to the competing demands 
                                                     
7 As Otsuka (2006, p. 135) writes: 
  
“our intuitive responses to cases provide a justification of our beliefs in the principles. This is just an 
instance of a more general phenomenon whereby our justification of our beliefs in what is 
explanatorily basic or primary often depends on support from our beliefs in what is explanatorily 
nonbasic or secondary. In effect, this happens whenever we reason from explanandum (i.e., that 
which is to be explained) to explanans (i.e., that which explains) by ‘inference to the best 
explanation’.” 
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of two profoundly different ways of responding to the equal moral worth of each person, 
each of which is a part of distributive morality, but neither of which represents the whole of 
it. In this, it follows the lead of Nagel (1979, p. 123 and p. 118): 
 
“Both the separate [non-aggregative] and the conglomerate [aggregative] methods 
count everyone fully and equally. The difference between them is that the second 
moves beyond individual points of view to something more comprehensive than any 
of them, though based on them. The first stays closer to the points of view of the 
individuals considered. (…) It is obvious that [these] conceptions of moral equality (…) 
are extremely different. They seem to be radically opposed to one another, and it is 
very difficult to see how one might decide among them. My own view is that we do 
not have to. A plausible social morality will show the influence of them [both].” 
 
 In sum, ARC represents a systematic attempt to do some justice to both the non-
aggregative and aggregative approaches. The way in which it does so is not ad hoc, because 
it appeals to a morally salient distinction found within the non-aggregative approach 
between claims with which one can and cannot identify.8 
                                                     
8 Halstead (forthcoming, pp. 8-9) also objects that this distinction cannot justify ARC because it assumes rather 
than justifies the non-aggregative approach. In Death versus Headaches, for example, one does not 
sympathize with the claims of people facing a headache only if one compares the claims one-to-one, which 
one should do only if the non-aggregative approach is right.  
This objection is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the attempted justification. The 
distinction between claims one can and cannot sympathize with is not intended to justify the non-aggregative 
approach. Rather, assuming the merits of the non-aggregative approach, it is used to explain why some 
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III. The Importance of Unchosen Alternatives 
 
A different class of objections targets the way in which ARC requires that one’s decisions 
depend on which alternatives are feasible. By way of illustration, consider a small but 
nonetheless significant loss that, while not relevant when compared to the loss of a life, is 
relevant when compared to paraplegia. Assume for the sake of the argument that this is the 
loss of a severed finger. Further assume that, on ARC, one death is outweighed by one 
thousand cases of paraplegia and, when only paraplegia and severed fingers are at stake, a 
thousand cases of paraplegia are outweighed by one billion cases of a severed finger. 
However, because the loss of a finger is, by hypothesis, not relevant when it competes with 
loss of life, when one must choose precisely one from the feasible set consisting of {saving 
one from death; saving a thousand from paraplegia; saving one billion from the loss of a 
finger}, ARC requires that one save the thousand from paraplegia, because this satisfies the 
greatest number of relevant claims.  
Several authors have argued along the following lines that the foregoing provides a 
decisive reason to reject ARC (Norcross 2002; Parfit 2003; Halstead forthcoming).  
 
Suppose one knows that one has the option to either save the thousand from 
paraplegia or the billion from a severed finger, but one is unsure whether one has 
the further option to instead save a single person from death. On ARC, if saving the 
single person from death is a feasible option, one ought to save those facing 
                                                                                                                                                                     
failures to satisfy the strongest claim would be especially morally problematic on this approach, and are 
therefore to be avoided by a view that accords the non-aggregative approach some respect. 
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paraplegia; if it is not feasible, one ought to spare the multitude the loss of a finger. 
Since so much hangs on whether the single person can be saved from death, an 
adherent of ARC should expend some effort on finding out whether he can indeed be 
saved. But this is perplexing, since whether he can be saved or not, the devotee of 
ARC will not save him. Why should one make an effort to establish the feasibility of 
an option which one knows one will not choose? 
Moreover, the hypothesized pattern of choice sits uneasily with the 
purported rationale for ARC. Suppose one initially believes that one’s only options 
are either to avert the cases of paraplegia or to spare each of the multitude a 
severed finger. In line with ARC, one plans to spare the multitude’s fingers. 
Subsequently, one discovers that one has the additional option of instead saving the 
one from death. ARC then holds that out of respect for what is at stake for the 
person facing death, one must save the paraplegics. But how can respect for what is 
at stake for the person facing death require not that we save him, but only that we 
save those facing paraplegia rather than those facing the loss of a finger?9 
 
In reply: I submit that the actions to which ARC leads in these scenarios and the 
justification it offers are, on reflection, neither unreasonable nor perplexing. Indeed, they 
have their analogues in common-sense deontological ethics. Consider the following 
scenario, which is of a kind first analysed by Frances Kamm (1985).  
 
                                                     
9 Norcross (2002), Parfit (2003), and Halstead (forthcoming) press a further objection using this scenario: that 
ARC violates principles of rational choice, including transitivity and Basic Contraction Consistency. These 
criticisms are answered elsewhere (see Voorhoeve 2013, Sec. 1; 2014, Secs. V and VI). 
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Spare Room Case. There has been a sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers, 
which your cash-strapped government is housing in inadequate camps. The 
government calls for volunteers to take in an asylum seeker for several months. You 
have a spare room and consider that taking in an asylum seeker would be a valuable 
way of greatly helping another, but would also disrupt your daily life and intrude on 
your privacy. You rightly conclude that taking in the asylum seeker is therefore 
supererogatory. You also decide that you would prefer to remain living alone. Just as 
you conclude your deliberations, an acquaintance with whom you used to be close 
writes that he has a few months off which he would like to spend in your city, staying 
at your place. Years ago, you stayed at his place for a similar length of time and 
promised him to return the favour. His stay would be a moderate burden on you, but 
it would not be permissible to break this promise merely in order to prevent the 
disruption of your everyday activities and the attendant loss of privacy. But it would 
be permissible to instead take in the asylum seeker and explain to your acquaintance 
that there is no space for him. If you must, in any case, bear the burden of having 
your life disrupted, you would rather accomplish a great good by doing so. You 
therefore volunteer to take in an asylum seeker. 
 
In this scenario, whether you can permissibly remain living alone rather than take in 
an asylum seeker depends on whether, in doing so, you would break a promise to your 
acquaintance. If you would not thereby break such a promise, you can permissibly remain 
alone; if you would thereby break such a promise, you may not do so (although you may, 
rather than fulfilling the promise, do the supererogatory act instead). Though such a 
scenario may be uncommon, these judgments flow from what I take to be common-sense 
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morality; they also seem perfectly reasonable. But note that they have the very implications 
that critics of ARC view as unacceptable. If you are uncertain whether or not your 
acquaintance has asked to stay (perhaps you do not remember the contents of the relevant 
email), you should undertake an effort to find out (say, by finding the email), even though 
you know that you will not accede to the request if he made it. Moreover, respect for the 
promise you made to him can be manifested not only by fulfilling it but also by changing 
what you plan to do instead of fulfilling it: the supererogatory rather than the merely self-
interested act. The moral significance of the promise lies in part in which alternatives it rules 
out, and you respect its importance by finding our whether it rules out any alternatives and 
by not choosing such an ineligible alternative. Similarly, ARC rules that it would be 
disrespectful to the person whose life is at stake to spare a multitude the loss of a finger 
rather than save his life. It would not be disrespectful to instead save many from paraplegia. 
As with a promise, the moral significance of what is at stake for each person, taken 
separately, lies in part in which alternatives it rules impermissible. You respect its 
significance by finding out whether it rules out any alternatives and by not choosing such an 
ineligible alternative. 
 
IV. ARC’s Fit with Practice and Our Moral Sentiments 
 
The final challenge I shall consider is that ARC is an implausibly radical doctrine (Broome 
2002 and Hausman 2015). As Hausman (2015, p. 213) puts it, defenders of ARC: 
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“must condemn the practices of existing public health systems, all of which devote 
resources to the treatment of minor ailments (…) rather than using them exclusively 
to treat or prevent serious and life-threatening conditions.” 
 
Moreover, Hausman adds, these health systems do so without generating significant 
public opposition. The most likely explanation for this fact is that ARC lacks both widespread 
public support and a plausible rationale.10 
In reply: the practice of treating minor harms may in fact be consistent with ARC 
once we drop two simplifying assumptions on which we have relied so far. The first of these 
is that all individuals in a condition will end up with the same level of health-related well-
being. In reality, minor ailments may generate large burdens. To take a common example: a 
cold, if untreated, can develop into a life-threatening lung infection. Even when such cases 
are infrequent, the relevant population may be so large that we can be confident that failing 
to provide public resources for the prevention or treatment of the typically minor ailment 
will lead to considerable burdens for some. According to ARC, these considerable burdens 
give rise to relevant claims. If prevention or treatment of a typically minor ailment is an 
efficient way of avoiding the burdens caused by its rare complications, then ARC requires us 
to devote resources to such treatment.  
Second, unlike in our two stylized cases, in practice, the means available to a public 
health system likely depend on the services it provides. It is a reasonable conjecture that for 
a host of minor ailments, it is more efficient to offer public provision rather than demand 
full out-of-pocket payment. If so, then the availability of treatment for minor but common 
                                                     
10 Hausman added these further points in discussion.  
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ailments in the public system will be something for which each citizen is, on purely self-
interested grounds, prepared to pay more.11 The resources available may therefore be 
larger when the public system offers treatment for minor ailments; such treatment then 
does not use funds that could instead be used by public health officials to treat more severe 
ailments. Claims to the prevention or treatment of minor ailments would then not be in 
competition with claims for the prevention or treatment of life-threatening ailments and 
ARC would not condemn satisfying the former, weaker claims.  
Of course, ARC does condemn this practice when these claims are in competition. 
The well-known priority-setting exercise for Medicaid in Oregon in 1990 provides a case of 
this kind. Medicaid serves poor individuals and families and is funded partly from state taxes 
and partly by the US Federal government, so that those who benefit from its interventions 
are not its primary funders. In the Oregon case, therefore, it was unlikely that the available 
funds would increase if common but minor ailments were covered. Resources for treatment 
for such minor ailments therefore competed directly with resources for life-threatening 
conditions. Infamously, on grounds of cost-effectiveness, officials recommended that tooth 
capping should take precedence over treatment for terminal appendicitis (Ubel et al. 1996). 
This proposal generated public outrage, precisely as one would predict if people’s moral 
sentiments conformed to ARC.  
Hausman considers this case, but concludes that ARC, which, he takes it, is grounded 
in “respect for [those] with the strongest claims,” is “unlikely to be the source of [this] 
outrage” (2015, p. 213). Instead, he writes, “a much more plausible explanation of our gut 
                                                     
11 I am grateful to Joseph Mazor for this suggestion. 
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reactions” is provided by “our compassionate outrage at the thought that our policy might 
let some people die in order to cure [minor ailments]” (2015, p. 213).  
Hausman’s argument appears to be this. Compassion with the person facing death, 
and only such compassion, is the most plausible basis for people’s condemnation of the 
policy that prioritized capping teeth over saving a life. But ARC is motivated only by respect 
for the strength this individual’s claim. Therefore, ARC does not reflect the grounds of 
people’s condemnation.  
Contrary to the second of these claims, ARC is grounded in both respect and in 
sympathy (or compassion). The process of sympathetically taking up each person’s position, 
one at a time, is motivated by respect for the separateness of persons. Respect for the value 
of another’s life also figures within this process, because it sets limits on the special concern 
for one’s dear self with which we can sympathize. When we engage in this process, 
sympathy with each person’s perspective provides us with a vivid sense of what is at stake 
for each person taken separately and motivates an overriding concern for a person for 
whom much more is at stake than for anyone else. It is plausible that both such respect and 
compassion motivated people’s responses to Oregon’s proposed policy. I conclude that the 
policies and sentiments Hausman mentions do not refute ARC; indeed, a real-world case in 
which there was a straightforward trade-off between averting deaths and curing minor 
ailments supports it. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
When one faces competing claims of varying strength on public resources for health, which 
claims count? I have given reasons for counting a claim just in case one could sympathize 
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with a person’s desire to prioritize it in the face of the strongest competing claim. I have 
argued that this principle yields appealing case judgments that cannot be explained by 
familiar rival principles of distributive justice. I have also argued that this principle is not 
vulnerable to several objections raised against it, and has a plausible grounding in both 
sympathetic identification with each person, taken separately, and respect for the person for 
whom most is at stake. 
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